

Legitimacy , trust and independence : The evolving role of the inspector in the governance of education.

**Dr Jacqueline Baxter – Associate Professor in
Public Policy and Management
Department of Public Leadership and Social
Enterprise .**

**The Open University Uk
Editor in Chief –Management in Education**



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Governability problems

- Less to do with the ability of system to maintain and renew itself than with the special dynamic of modern societies and the capacity of highly organized policy fields (such as education), to resist political guidance. (or anything that resembles it).
- Capacity of societal actors to act in an organized way can facilitate governing, so not so much type of governing instruments that are crucial , but a form of organizing the policy process in which needs of actors in the policy field are taken into account along with indications of side effects interdependencies and emerging problems
- Kooiman in Denhardt(2000) .




Legitimacy , Independence and Trust- why do they matter

Now more than ever Inspectorates need to be seen to be improving education in order to achieve legitimacy with the public.

Not straightforward – depends on :

1. Effects and Side effects of inspection regimes- stresses in the system.
2. Relationship with the media and how inspectorates are positioned within the media narrative
3. What public reputation the inspectorate has and how inspectors are perceived /trusted.
4. Who inspectorates report to and where they fit in the general system of education governance in that country.



Side effects of inspection in seven regimes Jones et al , 2017. (150 primary, 170 secondary schools).

Self report survey data from school principals .England, Netherlands, Ireland, Czech Republic, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland.

England and Netherlands, high pressure, Sweden , Ireland and Czech republic , medium and Switzerland and Austria, low pressure.

1.What is the prevalence of unintended consequences of school inspections across seven European Countries ?

2.What part does pressure play in precipitating these unintended consequences ?

Key Results

Clear association between increasing pressure in system= increase in narrowing curriculum and instructional strategies (IS) in school.

As pressure increases there is an associated increase in principals claiming that inspections have resulted in a re focusing of the curriculum and IS (50% in England and Netherlands , 10% or lower in Switzerland and Austria)

The system will act to reduce the effect of stress (Merton, 1936)

Campbell's law

The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision making , the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor (Campbell, 1976, p.49)

- 1.Intended strategic behaviour and gaming.
- 2.Unintended strategic behaviour , formalisation and proceduralisation , narrowing of curriculum , ossification, myopia (De Wolf and Janssens, 2007).
- 3.Stress in teachers, schools resting on their laurels (Perryman, 2007).

^aDurham University, UK; ^bJohannes Kepler University Linz, Austria; ^cDublin City University, Ireland; ^dUniversity of Teacher Education Zug, Switzerland; ^eUniversity of Gothenburg, Sweden; ^fCharles University in Prague, Czech Republic

Perceptions of Inspection/Inspectors , the media and legitimacy ? Instrument of trust or distrust ?

- Tabloidization of political communication
- Spectacle , drama and aestheticisation of the press – blurring of the divisions between political content and news , so as to elicit an *emotional response* rather than an informed one. (Martin, J,1992)
- England- Post Leveson ‘ *A bad inspection report makes a great story*’ , accusations of political partiality (Trojan Horse Affair, media triad)
- The public , how useful is inspection to them ?

The media do not invent social concerns
Nor do they deliberately organise the priorities in public debate.

But, in particular periods of real social change they
Cut through popular uncertainties with
A display of the political eternal verities
Around which , social consensus is sustained,
(Golding and
Middleton, 1982,p.59)

Inspection and the media,
the media and inspection

Jacqueline Baxter and Linda Rönnberg


The character of communication in England, Scotland and Sweden :

England- coloured by the background of ed journalists

Sweden- a legal official form of information –restrictions on who is allowed to speak and where

Scotland –largely confined to the specialist press.






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Trust in Inspection :


**trust in inspectors , trust in processes ,
trust in outcomes**

- In order to build capacity to improve there must be trust in accountability, but what type of accountability ?
- Dependent upon type of culture in which the inspection regime is situated
- High trust societies versus low trust societies



Inspection and trust

Inspection taps into trust on four levels



Edelman Trust Barometer (2018)

Trust Index A World of Distrust

Average trust in institutions,
general population, 2017 vs. 2018

Global Trust Index remains at distruster level

20 of 28 markets are distrusters, up 1 from 2017

Source: 2018 Edelman Trust Barometer.
The Trust Index is an average of a market's trust in the institutions
of government, business, media and NGOs. General population,
28-market global total.

▲ 2017 General Population

47	Global
72	India
69	Indonesia
67	China
60	Singapore
60	UAE
53	The Netherlands
52	Mexico
52	U.S.
50	Colombia
49	Canada
48	Brazil
48	Italy
48	Malaysia
45	Argentina
44	Hong Kong
44	Spain
43	Turkey
42	Australia
42	S. Africa
41	Germany
40	France
40	U.K.
38	S. Korea
37	Sweden
36	Ireland
35	Japan
35	Poland
34	Russia

▲ 2018 General Population

48	Global
74	China
71	Indonesia
68	India
66	UAE
58	Singapore
54	Mexico
54	The Netherlands
53	Malaysia
49	Canada
47	Argentina
47	Colombia
47	Spain
46	Turkey
45	Hong Kong
44	Brazil
44	S. Korea
43	Italy
43	U.S.
41	Germany
41	Sweden
40	Australia
40	France
39	Poland
39	U.K.
38	Ireland
38	S. Africa
37	Japan
36	Russia

Trust
(60-100)
Neutral
(50-59)
Distrust
(1-49)

Biggest changes in

U.S.	-9
China	+7
S. Korea	+6
UAE	+6
Italy	-5

Trust decline in the U.S. is
the steepest ever measured

What is trust and how does it relate to accountability and inspection ? Intelligent accountability based on trust



- **When people trust, people perform better.** (Hoy Tschannen-Moran (1999) Cerna found schools with high levels of trust also have a higher involvement of parents in the school and more honest and effective forms of collaboration between principal and teachers , teacher colleagues and parents and the school (Ehren, Baxter and Patterson , 2018).
- Various studies also show how **high levels of trust lead to higher job satisfaction of teachers and less burn-out** (Hoy and Tschannen-Moran, 1999; Friedman, 1991), **greater acceptance of, and engagement with external change and reforms** (Seashore-Louis, 2007) and most importantly, **improved student outcomes** (Bryk and Schneider, 2002; Forsyth, Adams and Hoy, 2011; Tschannen-Moran and Hoy, 2001).
- **Giddens (1990) gives experts a central role in system trust, as representatives of the system at ‘access points’ where the trustor experiences the system.**
- **Inspectors as boundary spanners** , the person interacting on behalf of the organization , it is also role based trust : **‘a transference form interpersonal to organizational trust can occur if the representative’s conduct is viewed as typical of the organization.’** (Kroeger, 2012, p,747).

Trust *reduces* transaction costs, the lower the trust the higher the transaction costs. In terms of inspection this means that inspectors in low trust societies must develop strategies to overcome this lack of trust.

Mayer et al (1995) Ability , Benevolence and Integrity model

The Inspector – what factors go to make up trust in inspectors ?

- **Competence:** perceived ability, or expectation that the other party has competence to successfully complete its task
- **Benevolence:** expectation that the other party cares about the trustor's interests and needs
- **Integrity:** expectation that the other party will act in a just and fair way; perception that the other party adheres to a set of principles that are acceptable



- *Control/monitoring/accountability builds trust by creating/enhancing shared values and naming and shaming immoral behaviour*
- **Trust** enables effective accountability as schools will be more open in sharing of weaknesses. *It reduces the inclination to guard against opportunistic behaviour*
- **Trust** allows for effective accountability- Inspectorates are less inclined to rely on elaborate safeguards for specifying, monitoring and enforcing standards =less conflict about outcomes of inspections.
- **If stakeholders** perceive accountability measures as legitimate and fair this increases trust and ownership and promotes self-directed adaptation and implementation of policy at sub central governance levels.(Ehren , Baxter and Paterson , 2018- Journal of Trust research



The role of professional standards in establishing trust

The terms “Code of Ethics” and “Code of Conduct” are often mistakenly used interchangeably. They are, in fact, two unique documents. **Codes of ethics**, which govern decision-making, and **codes of conduct**, which govern actions.

They provide direction to employees and establish a public image of good behaviour, and guide decision making in difficult situations.

Ethics guidelines attempt to provide guidance about values and choices to influence decision making. Conduct regulations assert that some specific actions are appropriate, others inappropriate.



Inspector as ‘boundary crosser’
The public face of inspection

Factors

What do we know

1. Inspectorates need to be seen to be improving education in order to achieve legitimacy with the public – not enough to know this internally.

1. Effects and Side effects of inspection regimes
2. Relationship with the media is and how inspectorates use the media ?
3. What public reputation the inspectorate has and how inspectors are perceived ?
4. Who inspectorates report to and where they fit in the general system of education governance in that country.



Questions

1. How you control for the side effects of your regime ?
2. What narrative does your inspectorate create in the media ? (and your inspectors on the ground ?)
3. How are your inspectors perceived ? By the public and teaching profession ? Do you have a code of ethics as well as a code of conduct ?
4. How does your training programme allow for ongoing development and professional dialogue ?

THANK YOU
Jacqueline Baxter
@drjacquebaxter
jacqueline.baxter@open.ac.uk

